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Abstract:  Primates undoubtedly have impressive abilities in perceiving, recognising, 
understanding and interpreting other individuals, their ranks and relationships; they learn 
rapidly in social situations, employ both deceptive and cooperative tactics to manipulate 
companions, and distinguish others’ knowledge from ignorance. Some evidence suggests 
that great apes recognize the cognitive basis of manipulative tactics and have a deeper 
appreciation of intention and cooperation than monkeys; and only great apes among 
primates show any understanding of the concept of self. None of these abilities is unique 
to primates, however. We distinguish (1) a package of quantitative advantages in social 
sophistication, evident in several broad mammalian taxa, in which neocortical 
enlargement is associated with social group size; from (2) a qualitative difference in 
understanding found in several distantly related but large-brained species, including great 
apes, some corvids, and perhaps elephants, dolphins, and domestic dogs. Convergence of 
similar abilities in widely divergent taxa should enable their cognitive basis and 
evolutionary origins to be determined. Cortical enlargement seems to have been 
evolutionarily selected by social challenges, although it confers intellectual benefits in 
other domains also; most likely the mechanism is more efficient memory. The taxonomic 
distribution of qualitatively special social skills does not point to an evolutionary origin in 
social challenges, and may be more closely linked to a need to acquire novel ways of 
dealing with the physical world; but at present research on this question remains in its 
infancy. In the case of great apes, their ability to learn new manual routines by parsing 
action components may also account for their qualitatively different social skills, 
suggesting that any strict partition of physical and social cognition is likely to be 
misleading. 
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Introduction 
Fifty years ago, human experimental psychology was dominated by learning theory: but 
the ‘cognitive revolution’ dramatically changed the nature of research into human 
behaviour. Since then, neuroscientists have regularly used non-human primates as a 
‘simpler’ model to test theories of human social cognition and information processing, 
with most laboratory studies of primates relying on a few species of macaque monkeys. 
During the same period, a growing number of psychologists, anthropologists and 
ethologists began studying the social behaviour of a wide range of non-human primates, 
both in the primates’ natural habitat and in the laboratory, in a parallel attempt to 
reconstruct the evolutionary history of human mental competence.  
In this review, we shall attempt to explain what these wider-ranging studies have 
shown us about non-human primate social cognition, in the hope that it will inform 
understanding in neuroscience and new work on humans. It is important to note there 
are numerous differences in behaviour between different primate species, even among 
different species of monkeys—as well as between monkeys and great apes, of which 
humans are one of several extant species including orangutans, gorillas and chimpanzees. 
These differences may reflect variations in the cognitive architecture, or they may result 
from socioecological differences between species that limit the expression of similar 
underlying cognitive capacity. Where appropriate, we therefore identify the primate 
species studied, in order to avoid the trap of treating all monkey species, or even all non-
human primates, as alike in their behaviour and cognition. 
Mimicking the paradigm shift in human experimental psychology, there has been a 
later and more gradual change towards cognitive explanations of animal behaviour. 
Earlier debates about behaviour were often dominated by the issue of whether ‘simple’ 
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associative learning could account for the data, or whether the animals ‘were cognitive’, 
usually taken to mean having conscious thought processes (Byrne and Bates, 2006; 
Macphail, 1998). As in the case of human experimental psychology, the associative 
approach was not refuted in principle, but the sheer effort and increasingly ad hoc 
appearance of associationist explanations for complex behaviour led to the ascendance of 
cognitive theorizing. A particular impetus for change came from the growing evidence of 
sophistication and complexity in primate behaviour: in taking account of a rich network 
of relationships (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1982a, 1986, 1990), in interpreting others’ 
intentions (Menzel, 1971, 1974; Premack, 1988; Premack and Woodruff, 1978), and in 
deploying subtle manipulative tactics (Byrne and Whiten, 1985, 1991, 1992; de Waal, 
1982, 1986; Whiten and Byrne, 1988). By the mid 1990s it had become acceptable to 
compare across species by taking a generally cognitive approach, framed in terms of 
information processing rather than consciousness (Byrne, 1995; Tomasello and Call, 
1997). This shift towards cognitive explanations of behaviour has now left us much 
better placed to generate and test hypotheses about the evolution of human cognitive 
skill.  
Much of the new evidence of complexity in primate behaviour came from the 
social realm, and comparable sophistication was not known for physical cognition (Byrne 
and Whiten, 1988; Cheney and Seyfarth, 1985; Jolly, 1966). This pattern meshed with 
Humphrey’s influential theory (Humphrey, 1976, 1981) that the evolutionary challenge 
for which the solution is ‘intelligence’ is more likely a social than a physical one. He 
argued that semi-permanent social living, as found in many primate species, sets up a 
selective pressure for increasing social sophistication. The fact that the competitors are 
conspecifics causes a ‘ratchet effect’ in which intelligence increases continually. Support 
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for this line of theorizing has come from finding that the size of the primate brain—
specifically, the neocortex—was closely related to measures of social group size (Dunbar, 
1992a, 1993, 1995, 1998) and social skill (Byrne and Corp, 2004; Reader and Laland, 
2001; Reader and Lefebvre, 2001).  
In contrast to primates, most non-primate vertebrate taxa are found in groups 
where the membership is inconstant and there is no evidence that individuals recognize 
each other as distinct and base their interactions on this individuality: they are ‘herd 
animals’, but not truly social. (‘Hefted’ ungulates such as sheep, faithful to a small range 
during their whole lives, may however be more socially sophisticated than is often 
recognized: for instance, recognizing other individuals by their faces and voices: Kendrick 
et al., 1995), but so far little work on cognitive skills has been conducted on these 
animals.) Where groups are inconstant aggregations, relationships between brain size and 
typical group size are lacking (Emery et al., 2007; Shultz and Dunbar, 2006, 2007), adding 
further support to the idea of a close relationship between brain enlargement and semi-
permanent social living—where groups are consistent in the long-term but membership 
can change over time, usually following rules such as one sex leaves the natal group at 
sexual maturity.  
These lines of evidence led to a consensus view that the early evolution of human 
intelligence within the primate lineage derives from increasing social complexity, as 
indicated by concomitant increases in brain size—a hypothesis variously called ‘social 
intelligence’ (Humphrey, 1976), ‘Machiavellian intelligence’ (Byrne, 1996a; Byrne and 
Whiten, 1988) or the ‘social brain’ (Brothers, 1990; Dunbar, 1998). The corpus of data 
has grown rapidly in the last 15 years, enabling us to examine the strength of this 
consensus. Where appropriate, we examine these data against a background of evidence 
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from the increasing range of species that have now been studied in cognitive terms (e.g. 
corvid birds, such as scrub jays, ravens and magpies; carnivores such as domestic dogs, 
hyaenas and meerkats; and ungulates such as pigs, elephants and their cetacean relatives 
bottlenose dolphins).  
Throughout the review, we use the everyday term ‘understand’ for the idea that 
the animal may represent meaning or unobservable causal connections in what it does or 
perceives; we treat understanding something as a matter of taking account of its underlying 
meaning or causal role in an appropriate way. There is of course a (human) sense of 
understanding which refers to private experience, and which we will therefore probably 
never know about in other animals. Moreover, because humans have the option of using 
language to recode and re-represent their experience, it is highly likely that no non-human 
‘understands’ things in quite the way an adult human would. These inevitable differences 
mean that it remains possible to construct plausible alternative explanations for virtually 
all the data of this review, in terms that have no close relation to human cognition but 
derive from behaviourist philosophy and animal learning theory (Heyes, 1994, 1996, 
1998; Macphail, 1985, 1998; Penn et al., 2008; Penn and Povinelli, 2007; Povinelli and 
Vonk, 2003). Our view is that, although explanations based on learning theory often 
provide valuable critical correction, and connectionist models of cognitive processes (in 
some ways the modern equivalent of the networks of unlabelled associations in 
behaviourist learning theory) have achieved notable successes in specific areas (e.g. Doi et 
al., 2009; Mayor and Plunkett, 2010), cognitive and neurocomputational explanations are 
not mutually exclusive, but instead provide different levels of explanation, each with 
different utility (Byrne and Bates, 2006). In any case, we consider it unlikely that disputes 
about the right approach to understanding the nature of cognition will be settled by logic 
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and decisive argument (Garzon and Rodriguez, 2009): which approach will prove more 
productive over time is an empirical question. 
 
Primate abilities in the social realm 
Knowledge of other individuals 
We have learnt much of what an animal understands about its companions from field 
playback of vocalizations. Playback studies have enabled researchers to simulate signals 
from specific individuals, or interactions between specific partners, using the target 
animal’s reaction as an index of what it knows. For example, playback studies have been 
used to study individual recognition in various animal species. Ground squirrels 
(Spermophilus richardsonii), marmots (Marmota flaviventris), and meerkats (Suricata suricatta) 
have all been shown to distinguish the identity of others from vocalisations. For marmots 
and ground squirrels, this allows individuals to determine whether alarm calls were given 
by reliable or unreliable group members (Blumstein et al., 2001; Hare and Atkins, 2001), 
but the function of this discrimination ability is not clear for meerkats (Schibler and 
Manser, 2007). Playback experiments have shown that monkeys are aware of the 
individual identity of others, and not only those individuals within their own group. 
Female vervet monkeys (Chlorocebus aethiops) remain in their natal group throughout life. 
When calls from females from groups who had been neighbours all their lives were 
broadcast, the target individuals reacted more strongly when the playback suggested the 
caller had transferred group (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1982b). (It is not clear why monkeys 
should be interested in the demography of social groups that they will never enter, but 
the data suggests they are.) 
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Vervet monkey mothers, hearing the cry of an infant, are not only more reactive 
towards their own infant’s cry, but when they are played the calls of other infants they 
look towards the real mother, showing they recognize mother-infant relationships 
(Cheney and Seyfarth, 1980).  Using match-to-sample, this result was confirmed in 
captivity for long-tailed monkeys (Macaca fascicularis), and extended to the sibling 
relationship (Dasser, 1988), showing that at least two sorts of kin relationship are 
distinguished. Moreover, after losing in conflict, monkeys of several species ‘redirect’ 
their aggression towards weaker individuals, but specifically towards relatives of the 
individual who defeated them (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1989; Judge, 1982), showing further 
awareness of kin relationships. (It is not suggested, of course, that these primates have an 
understanding of genetical kinship anything like that of humans.)  
Some Old World monkey species give specific greeting calls to dominants and 
subordinates. When target vervet monkeys hear playbacks, their reaction depends on the 
rank relationship between themselves and the caller. When the caller is dominant to 
themselves, and gives a ‘call to dominant’, their agitated reaction suggests they expect a 
high ranking individual nearby; whereas if the same monkey gives a ‘call to subordinate’, 
or a monkey subordinate to themselves gives a ‘call to dominant’, they give little reaction: 
they understand the ranks of third-parties relative to each other (Cheney and Seyfarth, 
1982a). Playback can even be used to simulate interactions between third parties: when 
baboons (Papio ursinus) hear sounds that suggest a rank reversal in the dominance 
hierarchy, they react with surprise, specifically if the reversal suggests that the normally-
stable rank relationships between matrilineal families have changed (Bergman et al., 
2003). Baboons evidently ‘eavesdrop’ on social relationships: when playback simulated a 
consorting pair moving apart, which would normally signal a mating opportunity, other 
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males were quick to head for the ‘female’ (Crockford et al., 2007). Thus it seems that 
some non-human primates are able to categorize rank relationships in very much the 
same ways as do the humans who study them, showing knowledge of relationships 
among third-parties and not just with respect to themselves, and of the likely degree of 
stability of rank relationships. 
The significance of these findings, from a cognitive perspective, is the implication 
they have for memory.  If an animal distinguishes its social companions and immediate 
neighbours as individuals, and knows where each ranks in comparison with others, and 
which other individuals stand in some sort of kin relationship to it, then the memory load 
increases exponentially with group size. In contrast, if an individual reacts to most 
conspecifics merely on the basis of their appearance and demeanour, as may generally be 
the case in many socially monogamous birds and herd species, then memory load is 
independent of group size; and if it reacts on the basis only of a dyadic relationship with 
itself, such as the dominance relationship from recent encounters, then memory load 
increases only linearly.  Although primate-like sociality is infrequent among other 
mammals, some species of carnivore, equines, certain dolphin and whale species and all 
species of elephant live in groups where they are part of a semi-permanent network 
rather than an amorphous herd. Social knowledge has yet to be explored in most of these 
taxa, but work has already begun. Most strikingly, using playback of vocalizations, African 
elephants (Loxodonta africana) have been shown to distinguish at least 80 individuals as 
familiar, compared to those less-familiar to them in the much larger social network 
(McComb et al., 2000). It is not known how much information they remember about 
each of these individuals, or even whether they are all recognized as such. However, in 
the same population, elephants have been shown to recognize as individuals, and keep 
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track of among their travelling party, at least 17 female family members based on 
olfactory cues found in urine (Bates et al., 2008b), and it is therefore entirely possible that 
elephant knowledge of familiar conspecifics is as deep as that of primates, but over a 
much larger number of individuals.     
 
Social tactics 
As well as good evidence that primates recognise individuals, kinship, rank, and the third 
party relationships between others, there is now extensive evidence that many species of 
primate regularly deploy subtle or manipulative social tactics during intra-group 
competition with these individuals.   
While dominance rank is just as important for a primate as it is for other social 
animals, rank is less likely to be a function of physical power, often deriving instead from 
the support of third parties (and this is not unique to primates: e.g. zebras: Schilder, 
1990). In female-resident monkeys like macaques, the mother may support her offspring 
against others ranking below her, and in particular her youngest offspring: the result is 
that offspring attain dominance ranks just below that of their mother, with the youngest 
the highest ranked (Sade, 1967). In all Old World monkeys, grooming is used to build up 
alliances, that accrue future benefits in other currencies (Dunbar, 1991), varying the 
exchange rate in a ‘biological market’ (Fruteau et al., 2009). Long-lasting social bonds 
‘pay’ in reproductive terms: the offspring of baboons that form strong social bonds with 
other females live longer, independently of health differences between the parents, and 
the effects persisted into offspring adulthood (Silk et al., 2009).  
Monkeys are selective in whom they choose to form alliances with, targeting their 
grooming and other affiliative interactions specifically at the most useful allies, such as 
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those who are dominant or who offer other benefits (Cheney, 1978; Harcourt, 1992). The 
same specificity in allocation of grooming to the most useful allies has recently been 
found in meerkats (Kutsukake and Clutton-Brock, 2010), and is perhaps likely in all social 
species that show allogrooming. Vervet monkeys are more responsive to the 
(experimentally played back) vocal signals of individuals who have recently groomed 
them, provided they are not close kin, in which case their responsiveness is always high 
(Seyfarth and Cheney, 1984). When their most important alliances are disrupted by 
competition, apes and monkeys of many species make efforts to reconcile afterwards: 
they are more likely to initiate grooming with a recent opponent than expected from 
control observations (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1989; Cords, 1992; de Waal and van 
Roosmalen, 1979; de Waal and Aureli, 1996; Kappeler, 1993). In baboons, vocalizations 
can be used effectively to reconcile with former opponents, at a distance (Cheney et al., 
1995); and even a friendly grunt given by the close kin of a recent opponent serves to 
reconcile recent aggressors (Wittig et al., 2007b). Likewise, support in aggressive contests 
can effectively be given by vocalization, creating a ‘vocal alliance’ (Wittig et al., 2007a), 
and baboons can infer the target of a vocalization from the context (Engh et al., 2006). 
Nurturing and repairing alliances among non-kin suggests that primates in some way 
understand that grooming, perhaps as an honest indicator of time invested (Dunbar, 
1992b), can be traded in the expectation of future benefits—a form of reciprocal altruism 
(Trivers, 1971). (Interestingly, in general, evidence for reciprocal altruism among any non-
human animals, including primates, is sparse and insecure: Clutton-Brock, 2009). One of 
the most intriguing ways in which primates manipulate their companions is shown in 
‘policing’, found in some macaque species, where a powerful individual intervenes to 
break up fights among subordinates (de Waal, 1989): the costs of policing falls only on 
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the intervener but the benefits accrue to all, making policing relatively unlikely to evolve 
(Flack et al., 2005).  Flack and her collaborators have used the technique of ‘knocking 
out’ particular individuals in a large group of pig-tailed macaques (Macaca nemestrina) to 
investigate experimentally whether policing is effective, finding that infrequent policing 
by a few powerful individuals significantly preserves the stability of social networks in the 
face of perturbations (Flack et al., 2006). Whether this form of ‘niche construction’ 
(Odling-Smee et al., 2003) is based on innate tendencies in pig-tailed macaques or some 
understanding of the social mechanisms is unknown. 
In contrast to cooperation based on temporary coalitions, seen in defence against 
predators or competing groups of conspecifics, or cooperative breeding systems such as 
those of callitrichid primates (Burkhart and Van Schaik, 2010), evidence for other forms 
of cooperation is more controversial. Cooperative hunting in wild chimpanzees (Pan 
troglodytes) has long been described (Teleki, 1973), but although the converging 
chimpanzees must seem cooperative to the out-manoeuvred prey individual, it is also 
possible that each chimpanzee follows its individually best strategy (Busse, 1976). A 
strong case for more than this has been made in the case of Taï chimpanzees of Ivory 
Coast, a population known for high levels of hunting: coordinated and distinctive 
individual roles have been described, including ‘driver’ and ‘ambusher’ (Boesch, 1994). 
Yet at Ngogo, Uganda, a study site where hunting is even more prevalent and similarly 
appears cooperative, the researchers were unable to be sure that more than individual 
selfish tactics were involved (Watts and Mitani, 2002). Cooperative hunting is routine in 
many social carnivores (e.g. spotted hyaenas Crocuta crocuta, some populations of lions 
Panthera leo and wolves Canis lupus: Grinnell et al., 1995; Holekamp, 2006; Mech, 1970; 
Stander, 1992) and at least one bird, the Harris’s hawk (Parabuteo unicinctus; Bednarz, 
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1988). Although Stander describes female lions taking account of the movements of 
others during hunts, the extent to which cooperation is based on any understanding of 
the strategies of others is usually unknown. An elegant exception is the work of Drea and 
Carter (2009) who presented pairs of spotted hyaenas with a rope-pulling task that could 
only be solved by cooperation. They found that hyaenas cooperated quickly and 
repeatedly, but also improved over time as individuals increasingly took account of the 
actions of the other, and showed accommodation towards a naïve partner.    
Captive studies show that, in principle, chimpanzees should be able to engineer 
cooperation, since they are able to understand another’s role in a two-role task, in which 
one player is able to see which of several handles will result in food reward for both 
participants, but only the other player can reach the handles (Povinelli et al., 1992a). In 
the same task, rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were able to learn either role—but when 
roles were switched, the monkeys had to re-learn the task from scratch, showing that, 
unlike chimpanzees, they had no real understanding of the cooperation involved 
(Povinelli et al., 1992b). When confronted with a task that requires cooperation, 
chimpanzees may need to learn how to recruit another individual to help (Hirata, 2007), 
but when proficient they select individuals to recruit who have previously been the most 
effective collaborators (Melis et al., 2006a). Whether chimpanzees do cooperate or not 
has been found to depend on the degree of social tolerance between the individuals 
(Melis et al., 2006b), and their higher general level of social tolerance allows captive 
bonobos (Pan paniscus)—sometimes called the pygmy chimpanzee, and a species not 
described to cooperate in the wild—to out-perform chimpanzees in cooperative tasks 
(Hare et al., 2007).  Although in general monkeys have failed to give evidence of 
cooperative abilities, cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus), a cooperatively breeding 
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species, not only performed well in a two-role task but showed similar capacities to 
chimpanzees in understanding the role of the other (Cronin et al., 2005). These studies 
suggest that temperament may be more important that cognitive architecture in whether 
or not a species is able to cooperate efficiently. 
Tactics of social manipulation that rely on deception for their effect are well 
documented in many species of primate (Byrne and Whiten, 1990; Mitchell and 
Thompson, 1986). In most cases, there is little reason to think the subjects themselves 
understand the act of deception—that is, creating a false belief in the deceived 
individual—and the data can instead be understood as a result of rapid learning in social 
circumstances, with no insight into how they work (Byrne, 1997b). However, there are a 
number of cases of deception, specifically in the great apes, which are very hard to 
explain in this way, and some understanding of mental states becomes a more plausible 
explanation (Byrne and Whiten, 1992). In corvine birds, too, deliberate deception has 
been described in the context of hiding or ‘caching’ surplus food, found in several 
species. Scrub jays (Aphelocoma californica) react to others’ seeing them cache their food, by 
re-caching it once they get the chance, in private—but only if they themselves have prior 
experience of pilfering the caches of others (Emery and Clayton, 2001). When hiding 
food items, jays prefer locations behind barriers or in shady locations. Ravens (Corvus 
corax) also take close account of who might have seen them make caches, and among 
other strategies may make ‘false caches’ of non-existent or trivial items when competitors 
are watching, delaying their approach to a cache if competitors are nearby, and searching 
at false sites until the competitor has left (Bugnyar and Kotryschal, 2004). We shall return 
to the cognitive implications of deliberate deception, below. 
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Perceiving others 
Many species of animal are known to distinguish a range of conspecific displays and body 
postures, including facial expressions; the greater the degree of control of facial 
musculature, the larger the number of facial expressions which may need to be 
recognized.  However, displays and expressions are to a large extent under the control of 
the signaller, and what information it wishes to share: it would be of great utility, 
therefore, if the involuntary or inevitable movements of the eyes, head and body that 
show the gaze direction and (presumably) the focus of an individual’s visual attention 
could also be read. Consequently, much effort has been devoted to understanding 
primate abilities at gaze-following and reading the attention of others.  
Gaze following is known in many species of animal (e.g. great apes Brauer et al., 
2005; goats, Kaminski et al., 2005; ravens, Bugnyar et al., 2004; ibises, Geronticus eremita 
Loretto et al., 2010), and is often taken to be an automatic, almost reflexive tendency. 
However, research on monkeys has found gaze following to depend on the particular 
facial expression of the model (Goossens et al., 2008), and that the ability to accurately 
follow gaze develops between infancy and adulthood (Ferrari et al., 2008); neither finding 
is consistent with the interpretation as a reflex. Moreover, in some species, gaze following 
is ‘smart’—that is, subjects are able to follow gaze geometrically. Analysis of collated 
records of primate deception suggested that Old World monkeys and apes are able to 
represent the geometric perspective of other individuals (Whiten and Byrne, 1988), 
although this was later disputed for monkeys (Kummer and Cords, 1991). Subsequently, 
the ability to follow gaze geometrically, looking ‘behind’ barriers that occlude the view 
from their own perspective, has been shown in several species (chimpanzees, Tomasello 
et al., 1999; spider monkeys, Ateles geoffroyi Amici et al., 2009; ravens, Bugnyar et al., 2004); 
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but not ibises, Loretto et al., 2010. In the wild, bee-eaters (Merops orientalis) have been 
found able to take the perspective of their predators, showing one obvious benefit to the 
ability to follow gaze geometrically (Watve et al., 2002). 
It would seem obvious that gaze following also indicates particular places, objects 
or activities that are the focus of others’ attention. Oddly, it has been surprisingly difficult 
to show that species gain useful information of this kind from gaze-following: for 
instance in finding food in an object-choice experiment: domestic dogs far outperform 
chimpanzees (Brauer et al., 2006; but see Krachun and Call, 2009). (Hand-reared wolves 
do not follow human gaze, apparently because they tend to avoid looking at faces so are 
unable to learn the significance of gaze direction: Miklosi et al., 2003). Even monkeys, 
able to use human pointing and other communicative cues, and to follow gaze, do not 
seem able to use gaze as a cue (Hauser et al., 2007). Recently, however, object choice on 
the basis of gaze following has been shown in lemurs Eulemur spp. (Ruiz et al., 2009), 
although not at high levels of success. Ruiz et al suggest that their results may not reflect 
a mentalistic understanding of what gaze means, but rather lemurs are equipped with two 
useful tendencies: gaze-following, in which gaze is traced to its end point (perhaps 
geometrically); and gaze-cueing, in which the objects at that point are investigated 
preferentially. With such tendencies, lemurs gain the benefit of having their attention 
drawn to useful objects and places, without perhaps understanding anything about what 
is in the mind of the individual whose attention they follow. We take it that other primate 
species will prove to have similar capacities, when analyses focus on the lower levels of 
success in object choice that they allow. (Ravens, whose performance is very like that of 
chimpanzees, have been shown able to use gaze for object choice with only small 
modifications of procedure: Schloegl et al., 2008a, b) Whether higher rates of success in 
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using gaze to choose objects, as shown for instance in dogs, needs any more mentalistic 
interpretation is not known.  
Understanding of the perceptual significance of another individual’s perspective 
has been much more readily shown in gestural communication. Great apes are sensitive 
to the ability of their audience to perceive gestures, choosing tactile or auditory modality 
when the target audience is not looking, and silent visual gestures only when they are 
(chimpanzees, Tomasello and Call, 2007; Tomasello et al., 1994; bonobos, Pika, 2007a; 
gorillas Gorilla gorilla, Genty et al., 2009; Pika, 2007b; orangutans Pongo spp., Liebal, 2007; 
Liebal et al., 2006). Moreover, some individual apes have shown that they understand the 
utility of concealing embarrassingly revealing signals, such as a chimpanzee who was once 
noticed to hide his penile erection from a dominant male until it subsided (de Waal, 
1982), or a gorilla who regularly hid his play face in order to surprise a play partner 
(Tanner and Byrne, 1993). The interpretation of these data shades into issues of 
understanding of the other’s thoughts, discussed below.  
In the great apes, there is evidence for ‘triadic’ interactions, in which two 
individuals interact both with each other and with an object, paying attention to the 
nature of the other’s interaction with the object (bonobos, playing with humans, Pika and 
Zuberbuhler, 2008; gorillas, playing with each other, Tanner and Byrne, 2010). The apes 
encouraged reluctant partners back into the game, and moderated their own abilities to 
continue the game as collaboration, in striking contrast to their normal competitiveness 
over food items.  
As with gaze following, shared attention to objects and the ‘intersubjectivity’ 
shown in triadic interactions over objects have been suggested to be important 
developmental precursors to theory of mind in humans (Trevarthen, 1977, 1980). One 
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theory of why non-human primates do not develop further along this route is that they 
lack the ability to make use of ostension, whereas the human infant is equipped to receive 
and use this ‘natural pedagogy’ (Csibra and Gergely, 2009) and is thus much better able to 
profit from human demonstrations.  The general lack of pedagogical teaching among all 
non-human primates supports this conjecture. Functionally-defined teaching has been 
recorded in several species of animal, including ants, babblers, meerkats, cheetahs and 
several callitrichid primates (Caro and Hauser, 1992; Thornton and Raihani, 2008). But 
none of these data suggest that the teacher understands the (lack of) knowledge of the 
learner; in contrast, observations suggesting deliberate pedagogy are very rare 
(chimpanzees, Boesch, 1991; killer whales Orcinus orca, Guinet and Bouvier, 1995), and 
consequently hard to interpret. However, other evidence does not support the 
uniqueness of human ostension. Whole-hand pointing is used and understood by 
chimpanzees (Leavens and Hopkins, 1996, 1999), and free-ranging rhesus monkeys have 
been found to follow a range of human communicative gestures, including pointing and 
head-indications after eye-contact was established, using them to locate hidden food 
(Hauser et al., 2007). 
 
Predicting and understanding the actions of others 
The ability to predict what others are likely to do next can be critical for survival. It is 
evident that a wide range of animals are well able to extrapolate the current behaviour of 
conspecifics, predators or prey, to anticipate what their next actions might be; but the 
evidence that they may also do this on the basis of understanding (representing 
unobservable causal factors) is more difficult to obtain.  
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In the case of social cognition, a key distinction for people is between accidental 
and intentional action, and whether non-human primates feel similarly has been 
investigated in various ways. A captive chimpanzee, when a person ‘accidentally’ spilled 
its prized orange drink and gave it nothing, subsequently continued to beg from that 
person; but if the loss appeared deliberate, with the juice just poured away, the 
chimpanzee avoided that person in future (Povinelli, 1991). However, it is difficult to 
disentangle the influence of emotion from knowledge in such a dyadic interaction, and 
when strict controls for demeanour were made the effect disappeared (Povinelli et al., 
1998; see also Call et al., 2004). To avoid this problem, chimpanzees, orangutans and 
children were trained on a simple task, where the rewarded choice was cued by previously 
placing a mark over the site; when additional, apparently ‘accidental’ cues were also 
dropped in conflicting sites, all three species responded the same way (Call and 
Tomasello, 1998). At first, the accidental cues were just ignored, showing clear 
understanding of the distinction; when the ‘accidental’ marking continued both apes and 
children began to investigate, choosing them instead—but, gaining no rewards, they later 
returned to following only the deliberately-placed cues.   
The signals that indicated intention in the experiments discussed so far are normal 
everyday actions for the humans whose behaviour the animals had to interpret; thus it is 
possible that the subjects had been able to learn that such signals carried meaning from 
their past experience alone.  What happens when a wholly new gesture is employed? 
Humans are able to relate the form of a gesture to the constraints of the environment: if 
one’s hands are full, one can ‘point’ with an elbow or foot and be readily understood. 
Non-human primates show the same flexibility, with identical results in cotton-top 
tamarins, rhesus monkeys and chimpanzees (Wood and Hauser, 2008). When an 
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experimenter, carrying a large object, touched one of two food wells with his elbow, the 
subjects responded just as if he had used his hand normally, preferentially investigating 
that place (Wood and Hauser, 2008). But when the same experimenter used his elbow, in 
the same way but with his hands not engaged, the gesture was ignored, just as was a 
hand-touch that looked unintentional. A similar ability, to differentiate the relevance of 
an action from its situational context, has been noted when preverbal infants copy 
actions (Gergely et al., 2002). When a switch is pushed with the experimenter’s head, the 
infant only copies that detail if the model’s hands are free; if he is holding a cloak, then 
the infant simply uses her hand: this has been described as ‘rational imitation’.  
Modifications of this paradigm have been used with chimpanzees that have been reared 
with humans, and with domestic dogs; in both cases, the subjects showed ‘rational’ 
selectivity of what to imitate (Buttleman et al., 2007; Range et al., 2007).  
 
Understanding of another’s thoughts 
Often treated as the cognitive Rubicon between humans and other animals, the suite of 
abilities that ultimately allows us to interpret other people’s actions in an intentional way 
as a consequence of their desires, knowledge and beliefs, has been subject to immense 
research activity over the 30-odd years since Premack and Woodruff first asked, “Does 
the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?” (Call and Tomasello, 2008; Premack and 
Woodruff, 1978). We can give here only a sparse summary of this literature for non-
human primates.  
Throughout the period, there has been something of a gulf between the 
conclusions of observers of natural primate behaviour, and those who carry out 
controlled laboratory studies (de Waal, 1991). Of course, it is easy to over-interpret the 
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richness of observations, and experiments may fail for many reasons other than cognitive 
limitations of the subjects, so some gap is to be expected—but in this case, more seems 
to be going on. In particular, analysis of primate behavioural deception based on 
observational data concluded that, although most records could well reflect no more than 
rapid learning in social contexts, some did imply more (Byrne and Whiten, 1985; Byrne 
and Whiten, 1992; Whiten and Byrne, 1988; for chimpanzees, specifically, see also de 
Waal, 1982, 1986). Evidence was noted that great apes of all species seemed to represent 
the ignorance, knowledge and false belief of other individuals. This proposal has been the 
subject of much dispute and many empirical studies.  
An early paradigm for investigating whether animals understand the difference 
between knowledge and ignorance and realize the connection between seeing and 
knowledge has been called the ‘guesser/knower’ design (Povinelli et al., 1990). In it, the 
subject is confronted with conflicting hints as to which of several sites has been baited: 
from one individual who was clearly present at and able to see the baiting, the knower, 
and one who was not, the guesser.  Initial reports that chimpanzees could solve this 
puzzle, whereas rhesus monkeys could not (Povinelli et al., 1991), were challenged 
because experiments gave differential reward during testing, and thus rapid learning 
might simulate understanding (Heyes, 1993). Careful re-analysis showed this to be very 
possible (Povinelli, 1994). A subsequent study with domestic pigs, using a design that 
avoided rewarded test trials and used conspecifics as informants rather than humans, 
identified one pig that apparently understood the seeing/knowing connection, although 
other subjects’ data were ambiguous (Held et al., 2001). Extensive work with 
chimpanzees, using a simpler paradigm in which the subject must beg for food from an 
experimenter who may or may not be able to see them, concluded that the chimpanzee 
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has no general understanding of the relationship between seeing and knowing (Povinelli 
et al., 2000; Povinelli and Eddy, 1996; Povinelli et al., 1994).  
One possible problem with these designs is that they depend on the subjects 
taking cues from helpful onlookers, or expecting help from others: chimpanzees and 
indeed most non-human primates may have little natural experience with such 
cooperative interactions (Hare and Tomasello, 2004). Suspecting that this might have 
been the problem, Hare and co-workers designed a competitive perspective-taking task, 
in which the subject must assess what its (dominant) competitor has been able to see of 
foods that may be hidden by visual barriers, and avoid competing for food that it knows 
about (Hare et al., 2000). With this design, chimpanzees clearly showed that they were 
well able to compute what a competitor had seen from witnessing the situation from its 
own perspective, confirming the evidence for geometric perspective taking discussed 
already. Moreover, when the competitor was swapped for another equally dominant 
individual, mid-experiment, the subjects took account of the lack of prior exposure of the 
newcomer: they were apparently able to represent what others had previously seen, in other 
words what they know, as well as what they can currently see (Hare et al., 2001). 
Although some still dispute this interpretation (Karin-D'Arcy and Povinelli, 2002; 
Povinelli and Vonk, 2003), considerable converging evidence now supports the 
contention that chimpanzees can appreciate the knowledge versus ignorance of other 
individuals (Call and Tomasello, 2008; Tomasello et al., 2003). When tested in a 
competitive situation, rhesus monkeys also show understanding of the visual perspective 
of others: where they could steal a grape from one of two humans, they reliably chose the 
person who was unable to see their action (Flombaum and Santos, 2005). Similarly, 
monkeys evidently understand the connection between hearing and knowing, preferring 
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to take food from ‘quiet’ containers that will not alert an inattentive competitor to their 
theft (Santos et al., 2006). Experimental study of caching in scrub jays suggests, in this 
corvine bird, understanding of knowledge similar to that found in chimpanzees.  If two 
(jay) competitors have seen a jay cache different items in different places, the jay 
remembers who has seen what, and takes measures appropriately when confronted with 
one or the other competitor (Dally et al., 2006). 
It is much less clear whether any non-human species understands the concept of 
false belief: part of the problem is that experiments with non-verbal subjects can easily 
become very complex, which itself may make for failure. Kaminski and colleagues 
attempted to tackle this question by using a competitive game between two individuals, 
either children or chimpanzees, in which the subject could make only one choice in each 
trial: they could opt for turning over one of three cups, having seen a high-quality food 
item placed under one of them, or choose a low-quality reward instead (Kaminski et al., 
2008). The two subjects took it in turn to choose first, and the second could not see what 
the first had chosen: the high-quality item might already have been taken by then. Indeed, 
when they had seen a cup baited with a high quality food, and also seen that the other 
saw the same baiting process, both 6-year old children and chimpanzees wisely avoided 
that choice when it was their turn. Both species therefore showed differentiation between 
knowledge and ignorance. In a second experiment, the experimenter picked up the food 
after the baiting process, and either put it back or moved it to a new location: conditions 
differed in whether both subjects, or only the second to choose, saw this extra move. In 
the latter instance, the smart strategy is to go for the high-quality food, since the first 
subject should have falsely believed that the food was elsewhere and wasted their turn. 
Six year old children, but not 3 year olds, used this strategy, showing that the task was not 
 24 
too complicated for older children to use their understanding of false beliefs in its 
solution. The chimpanzees did not.  However, other work suggests that babies much 
younger than 3 years can represent false beliefs (Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate 
et al., 2007), so the failure of the 3 year old children—and thus also of the 
chimpanzees—in Kaminski et al’s task may after all reflect confusion from the task’s 
complexity.   
Rather similar findings were obtained with free-ranging rhesus monkeys, using a 
simpler design (Santos et al., 2007). Santos and colleagues used an expectancy-violation 
experiment, using looking-time as an indication of surprise, based on the task originally 
devised for human infants (Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005). Subjects were presented with a 
stage on which a plastic lemon was able to move on a track, from side to side: in the 
critical trials, the human presenter was apparently unable to see some of the movements 
of the lemon because of an occluder, although the monkey could. Thus, if the occluder 
was absent and the presenter watched closely while the lemon moved to a new location, 
they should have a true belief of its position; but if the occluder blocked their view during 
the same move, they should have a false belief (out of date information) about the 
current position. When monkeys watched the presenter’s subsequent search for the 
lemon, their looking times showed they expected the presenter to search in the right 
location in the true belief condition, and were surprised (longer looking time) if they 
searched elsewhere. However, in the false belief condition, looking times did not differ: 
monkeys, unlike human infants, appeared not to have any expectations in this case 
(Santos et al., 2007). Perhaps the only animal able to compute the consequences of a false 
belief in another is the human; but the deceptive behaviour of corvids and great apes is in 
conflict with that conjecture, and resolution is needed. 
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Understanding the self 
Against the background we have so far sketched of impressive abilities in perceiving, 
recognising, understanding and interpreting other individuals, one failing is striking in 
animals: the failure to recognize the subject’s own face in a mirror. Of course, individuals 
of any species would need experience to grasp the true origin of the realistic moving 
image they see in a mirror—even humans, as first contacts with New Guinea highlanders 
showed repeatedly in the last century. But animals that live as human pets, or that are 
given months to explore a fixed mirror in a zoo cage, have ample opportunities: to touch 
its surface; to notice the match between the fingers/paws/hooves/etc. visible in and on 
the mirror; to observe parts of their own body and those of other individuals, both 
directly and in the mirror, moving in step. Nevertheless, the great majority of animals 
persist in giving ‘social’ responses, as if the image were another individual not themselves, 
or learn only to avoid looking at the mirror.  Even monkeys, many species of which have 
been tested with the classic ‘mark test’ (Gallup, 1970), where a surreptitious mark is 
placed on a part of the head which the animal cannot see, completely fail to give any 
evidence they realize the face in the mirror is their own (Parker et al., 1994). (And other 
paradigms that have been claimed to show self-recognition in monkeys remain highly 
controversial: Anderson and Gallup Jnr., 1997; Hauser et al., 1995). It is not that 
monkeys cannot understand the geometric transformation produced by a mirror, because 
they readily learn to use a mirror to guide out-of-sight actions (Anderson, 1984).  But 
those species that recognize themselves in mirrors are the exceptions. 
All species of great ape do recognize themselves in mirrors (Parker et al., 1994; 
Povinelli et al., 1993), although not every individual of any of them (Mitchell, 1996; 
 26 
Swartz and Evans, 1991). Similar evidence of self-recognition, including appropriate 
responses in the mark test, has been found in a corvine bird, the magpie Pica pica (Prior et 
al., 2008). In addition, both bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus) and gibbons (Hylobates 
spp.) have given indications that they understand their mirror images, such as mirror-
contingent movements and use of the mirror to inspect parts of their body (Hyatt, 1998; 
Reiss and Marino, 2001; Ujhelyi et al., 2000); it is difficult to see how dolphins could do 
much more to convince, whereas gibbons have repeatedly failed the mark test 
(Suddendorf and Collier-Baker, 2009). Asian elephants (Elaphus maximus) have been 
tested for mirror self-recognition several times, with mixed results (Plotnik et al., 2006; 
Povinelli, 1989; Simonet, 2000). Plotnik and colleagues report one elephant that 
responded quite differently when it had been surreptitiously marked with a visible spot, 
and did not do so when sham-marked invisibly, suggesting self-recognition; however, 
these responses were not immediate on catching sight of its mirror image, as is seen in 
the case of great apes, nor particularly performed in front of the mirror.  
In trying to understand what prevents most species accomplishing what appears 
to be a simple matching task—and therefore what is special about humans and other 
great apes, magpies and probably dolphins and elephants—it may help to consider 
another ‘strangely lacking’ sign of understanding: that of death. Whereas humans are 
highly disturbed by the death of a close companion, and usually show some sort of 
mourning, most animals do not. Farmed red deer (Cervus elaphus), for instance, give no 
reaction when one of their daily companions is shot through the head and falls dead as 
they feed around it (John Fletcher, pers comm.): they are habituated to the sound of a gun, 
and no distress signals are given by the deer because it dies instantly. Stillborn infants are 
often carried or groomed by their mothers, in monkeys and especially great apes, and also 
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sometimes by carnivores like leopard (Panthera pardus); but it is difficult to interpret these 
isolated observations.  The behaviour of African elephants, then, stands out, because they 
show a special interest in the bodies of their kind, as well as showing empathic and 
helpful reactions towards distressed or dying individuals (Douglas-Hamilton et al., 2006); 
these behaviours are directed towards both kin and non-kin. Experimentally, stronger 
reactions of curiosity and exploration were shown to elephant bones and tusks (washed 
clean of scent with detergent) compared with similar-sized bones of other species 
(McComb et al., 2006). While the elephant graveyard is a hoary myth, elephants do seem 
to show strong and unusual reactions to the death of a conspecific compared to most 
species.  The recent description of the death of a chimpanzee within a cohesive and long-
established social group strongly suggested that this species, too, has some understanding 
of death (Anderson et al., 2010): pre-death care, inspection of the body for signs of life, 
night-time attendance at the corpse by relatives, and later avoidance of the site of death.  
Since individuals of almost every social species will have opportunities to observe 
conspecific death and its consequences, the real mystery is why such reactions are so rare. 
One possibility is that, without a representation of the self as an entity, the death of 
others has no personal significance, unless one is immediately dependent on their aid. 
Similarly, without a mental representation of the self as independent entity, it may be 
impossible to understand the face staring back from the mirror. If so, then those species 
likely to react with understanding to the death of others should be specifically those 
showing self-recognition (as suggested by Gallup, 1979).  This hypothesis could be tested 
by further research on reactions to conspecific death, concentrating on species well-
known to be able or unable to recognise themselves in a mirror. Reactions to the death of 
companions and recognition of the self are phenomena that may also relate to a general 
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capacity for empathy, which has similarly been identified in the great apes (de Waal, 2009; 
de Waal, 2008) and in elephants (Bates et al., 2008a). 
 
What underlies primate social sophistication? 
As this brief review has demonstrated, social sophistication is by no means unique to 
primates, nor is it uniform within non-human primate species. Unfortunately, comparable 
work on many other species is still in its infancy compared to that on primates, so there is 
no ‘level playing field’ of comparison. Based on the evidence currently available, however, 
we shall distinguish between social complexity that is a matter of degree—knowledge of 
more social companions, more frequent use of alliances, more complicated manipulative tactics 
that depend on picking more subtle aspects of behaviour, finer and more elaborate 
categorizations, larger brain (part) sizes that correlate with larger social groups—from 
social complexity that requires a deeper understanding of mechanism and mind, including 
the understanding of the self as an entity, and perhaps of the false beliefs of others, 
which is apparently very much more limited. In the case of great apes, there is some 
evidence for both these features. In other taxa, it may be that either type of social 
sophistication can occur without the other—for instance, social carnivores apparently 
show quantitative social complexity, whereas some corvids give evidence of deeper 
understanding—so the selective pressures that led to their evolution may be different in 
kind.  We shall examine the pattern of species differences in social sophistication, using 
the comparative method, for evidence of their evolutionary origins, and assess whether 
these ‘two types of intelligence’ derived from the same or different selection pressures. 
Then, we shall return to the issue of what cognitive mechanisms might underlie the social 
competence seen in animals.  
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Evolution of species differences in intellectual ability 
Theories of what led ultimately to human intelligence abound; but to assess them it is 
critical that the pattern of abilities among living primates and other relevant species be 
properly characterized. Use of brain size (or neocortex size, executive brain size etc.), 
appropriately scaled against the rest of the brain, as a proxy for intelligence has shown 
increases with group or clique size in all groups of primates (Barton and Dunbar, 1997; 
Barton and Harvey, 2000; Dunbar, 1992a, 1998), giving strength to Humphrey and Jolly’s 
earlier suggestions that social complexity selects for intellectual increase (Humphrey, 
1976; Jolly, 1966). (Scaling against body size is inappropriate for estimating the 
intellectual potential of a given brain size, although it has often been used for that 
purpose. Instead, it is useful as a measure of the brain’s ‘cost’ to the animal: Byrne, 1996).  
Comparing with data from other mammals gives support to social complexity as the 
forcing function that leads to quantitative increases in social skills. Similar correlations to 
those found in primates, between neocortex enlargement and social group size, have been 
found in carnivores, insectivores and bats (Barton et al., 1995; Dunbar and Bever, 1998). 
In even-toed ungulates, none of whose cognitive abilities seem to rival those of primates, 
there is no similar relationship between brain size and group size (Shultz and Dunbar, 
2007), presumably because individual recognition and social differentiation is not a 
feature of these groups. However, among birds, where the common association pattern is 
social monogamy, and no group size effects have been found, ape-like abilities have been 
discovered in corvids (ravens, scrub-jays, magpies); this evidently cannot be explained in 
the same way (Emery et al., 2007). This strongly supports the speculation that two 
different evolutionary pressures have effected change in animal intelligence.   
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If, at least among mammals, living in a semi-permanent social group presents a 
particularly acute intellectual challenge (Byrne and Bates, 2007), what are the key aspects 
of that challenge? Two main suggestions have been made: 
(a) Arms-race: social competition within the group may favour those with greatest social 
ability, and hence brain size, but in the next generation the population averages will have 
increased, giving a runaway arms-race (Humphrey, 1976). But the tendency to create an 
arms-race would seem to be shared with other theories: for instance, social competition 
by means of skilful interaction with the environment, promoting increased physical 
cognition; and interactions with food competitors, predators or prey. (And in the latter 
case, the evolutionary pressure is greater as the stakes are higher.) Also, in general, kin 
relationships within primate groups might be expected to reduce the benefits of any 
individual competition within the group. 
(b) Unpredictability: whereas the environment may be complex but is ultimately 
predictable, social interactions with similarly-intelligent, behaving agents will always 
remain more difficult (Barton, 2006). But, again, predator/prey interaction is surely just 
as unpredictable, and finally more critical as lives are at stake.  
Fossil evidence supports the conjecture that predator-prey interactions are a 
powerful selection factor for intelligence, with arms-races between predators and prey 
evident in the step-by-step increases in brain size of both, co-evolving in the same 
continent (Jerison, 1973), and reduction of brain size in island species lacking predators, 
compared to their relatives and ancestors in continental habitats (Byrne and Bates, 2007). 
As a resolution of this issue, we suggest that all competition that is based on knowledge 
of the behaviour of animate entities should be seen as affecting ‘social’ cognition (Byrne 
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and Bates, 2007); continual unpredictability is found, and arms races are set in train, 
whether the challenge is dealing with predators or companions. 
However, it may be that the focus on social cognition by researchers has eclipsed 
more general cognitive differences: if so, social competence might be a side-effect of 
some other, external factor; or selection for social skill might give side-benefits in other 
areas. Critical to this debate is whether primates are specialized in social intelligence but 
remain primitive in their representation of the physical environment, or show advanced 
intelligence in any domain that is tested. The debate is an old one also in human 
intelligence: the question of single-factor (g) versus multiple intelligences has been long-
discussed, and time has brought no clear resolution. The case for modular social 
intelligence in monkeys was made by Cheney and Seyfarth (1985, 1990), but a recent 
meta-analysis of an extensive range of laboratory tests of primate ability supports single-
factor intelligence in primates (Deaner et al., 2006). Under natural conditions too, there is 
evidence in favour of a single factor behind differences in species intelligence among 
primates: a similar relationship has been found with brain size in social skills (deception, 
Byrne and Corp, 2004; social learning, Reader and Laland, 2001) and physical skills (tool-
use and innovation, Reader and Laland, 2001). The forcing function that led to species 
differences in primate ancestry might therefore have been challenge in either social or 
physical cognition—or both, at different times in evolution. There is growing evidence 
for the latter scenario. 
Brain-size differences and reliance on sophisticated social manoeuvring are well 
correlated across primate species in general, and the relationship of brain size to group 
size provides a strong case that social challenges selected for intellectual advance over a 
long—60Mya—timescale. As suggested above, ‘social’ should be seen to include 
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challenges met by information processing in the context of predator/prey interactions, as 
well as those from living with conspecifics. With this interpretation, linked increases in 
intelligence and brain size in a much wider range of species may be understood. 
But in the great apes, that theory fails: social challenge, as measured by group size, 
does not differ between ape and monkey species, whereas capacity in some cognitive 
dimensions—such as understanding cooperation, intention and deception, and mirror 
self-recognition—do (Byrne, 1997a). Instead, what is notable about apes, contra monkeys, 
is that all genera of living great apes show special skills in manual food processing: Pongo, 
in accessing spiny rattans and palms (Russon, 1998), and for extracting honey and seeds 
with tools (Fox et al., 1999); Gorilla, for processing physically-defended herb resources 
(Byrne, 2001); Pan, in collecting insect foods with tools, often ones made themselves and 
sometimes sets of two tools for a more complex task(McGrew, 1994; Sanz and Morgan, 
2007). Moreover, in captivity all great apes demonstrate remarkably similar tool-using and 
tool-making abilities, though many populations show no tool-use in the wild (McGrew, 
1989), suggesting that the underlying cognitive skills—all ones to do with feeding—have 
an ancient origin in the common ancestry of all the modern lines. For these reasons, it 
has been argued that the cognition of the great apes (that is, the qualitative differences 
from monkeys in their understanding of mechanism and mind) developed over a much 
shorter timescale, since the living species share common ancestry at about 16 Mya 
(Byrne, 1997a).  
Why should great apes have faced greater challenges in the physical environment 
than monkeys? They are all larger-bodied, and adapted to brachiation, allowing small-
branch feeding but making long range travel inefficient; yet in nearly all habitats they are 
found today, great apes compete directly with monkeys for ripe fruit and tender leaves. 
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Old World monkeys are able to digest coarser material than apes, so able to exploit 
ripening plant food before their competitors.  Since monkeys appear to possess all the 
aces, it becomes a problem to explain why great apes did not become extinct (although 
many species did, after 14Mya). The suggestion is that the surviving great apes were able 
to compete by developing skills to reach foods that monkeys could not reach, as shown 
today in their expertise at extracting insects and dealing with plant defences: abilities that 
give them advantages in the domain of physical rather than social cognition. The finding 
in corvid species, few of which are social, of remarkably similar cognitive skills to those 
of apes similarly points to physical cognition as the driving function for these capacities 
(Emery and Clayton, 2004, 2009). 
An interesting exception to the lack of need for tool use in monkeys is the recent 
discovery of hammer and anvil use in wild capuchin monkeys (Cebus libidinosus) (Fragaszy 
et al., 2004; Moura and Lee, 2004). The monkeys transport heavy stones to nut-cracking 
sites, selectively choosing stones of appropriate hardness and size, and of weights 
appropriate to different kinds of nuts cracked, showing an ability to anticipate their future 
needs (Greenberg et al., 2009; Visalberghi et al., 2009). This local tradition of nut-
cracking is found in several areas of Brasil, but always in arid and inhospitable ones: 
although capuchin manual skills in no way rival those of great apes, it may be significant 
that they are similarly brought to their apex by severe feeding challenge.  
Increasing evidence suggests that, at least in great apes, the repertoire of cognitive 
skills in any individual also depends on opportunities for social acquisition of knowledge 
(van Schaik et al., 1999; van Schaik and Knott, 2001; strong evidence for transmission of 
social habits has also been found in capuchin monkeys, Perry et al., 2003; Perry and 
Manson, 2003). ‘Species intelligence’, by analogy with usage of the term intelligence in 
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differential psychology, refers to the innate potential for cognitive power of every 
individual of the species; but the extent to which that potential is realized may depend on 
an individual’s social network (Meulman and Van Schaik, 2009). This ‘cultural 
intelligence’ view applies most radically to the difference between individuals reared in 
the wild or captivity: between the bleak circumstances of an old-fashioned zoo and the 
enriched environment of a human home, or between either and the complex 
environment of a tropical forest. We expect that among wild populations of some 
animals (at least, the great apes) the set of cognitive skills in any population will differ, 
not simply because of the social group size or group complexity, but more specifically on 
the opportunities for social learning afforded to individuals within the population.  
 
The cognitive basis for differences in social abilities 
We have suggested that two accounts are required to explain the differences in cognitive 
skills observed among primates, as well as some other animals. Quantitative differences in 
social knowledge and social tactics, as seen in several mammalian radiations and in which 
neocortex size correlates with social group size, need to be distinguished from the 
qualitative differences in understanding, seen in great apes, some corvids and possibly 
others such as dolphins and elephants.  
The quantitative differences are the simpler to explain: as variation in memory 
abilities (Byrne, 1996a). If neocortical volume affects the ability to record information 
about identity, association patterns and past histories of behaviour of individuals, then a 
need to live in socially more challenging settings would be expected to select for increase 
in neocortex size, underwriting continuous variation in abilities. Correlated increases in 
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non-social abilities are a by-product of this selective effect, based on the fact that a large 
and efficient system of perceptual categorization and memory has many other uses.  
A bigger problem is to explain the qualitative differences in social understanding, 
seen in fewer taxa and not associated with social group size. Although no non-human has 
clearly been shown to represent false belief, the abilities of great apes—and some corvine 
birds, dolphins and perhaps a few other species—in cooperation, deception, perception 
of intent, and mirror self-recognition, seem sufficiently distinct from those of monkeys 
and all other terrestrial mammals to require a different explanation.  We develop one 
possibility here, based on mental representation of behavioural structure, but others are 
surely possible.  
The issue is to what extent innate structure is needed to ground new knowledge—
and this is nowhere more acute than in the social domain. Both in primatology and 
developmental psychology, researchers have shown that statistical regularities can be 
extracted from complex input information, potentially underwriting remarkable abilities 
that are often ascribed to more ‘thinking’ processes. Most dramatically, 8-month old 
infants were found able to segment fluent speech after only 2 min exposure: since the 
speech was made up of artificially-generated nonsense syllables, only the rules by which 
the syllables were made up from letter sounds could have allowed this segmentation, 
showing a powerful innate ability to detect and use statistical regularities (Saffran et al., 
1996). Adult humans, shown videos of familiar manual activities reduced to moving 
patterns of fluorescent dots on limb-joints, were able to segment the activities into phases 
which corresponded to meaningful subroutines of the overall behavioural program, even 
though the subjects had no indication what each activity was about (Baldwin et al., 2008). 
In the non-human primate domain, Byrne (1999, 2003) showed that the ability of great 
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apes to learn novel structures of skilled action by observation can parsimoniously be 
accounted for by just such behaviour parsing abilities, without requiring prior understanding 
of the model’s purposes or how their behaviour achieved its effect. When a goal-directed 
manual activity is carried out repeatedly by a skilled practitioner, the activity contains 
clues in its pattern of statistical variation—the location of pauses, the sections of process 
which can be omitted or substituted with others, the regularity of sequences of certain 
steps among the general variation of movements—which allow the underlying ‘program-
level’ structure of action to be discerned. This may account for the differences among 
animals in imitative learning. For instance, although imitation has often been claimed in 
primates, most cases can be accounted for rather simply as priming effects, acting upon 
existing motor skills, rather than involving new learning  (Bates and Byrne, in press; 
Byrne, 2002a; Hoppitt and Laland, 2008). Only in the great apes does it seem that 
imitation involves learning new skills by assembly of novel actions from components (a 
recent challenge to the data underlying this statement is based on a misunderstanding of 
program-level imitation: Byrne et al., in prep; Tennie et al., 2008). This difference implies 
that only great apes, among primates, have behaviour parsing capacities. 
Can this theoretical formulation be extended more generally in the social domain? 
In principle, it would seem so: just as the behaviour parsing model, in its rather Humean 
approach to causality, treats correlations as causal, so intentions may be treated as those 
results that satisfy an agent that has been seen to be engaged in directed activity (Byrne, 
2006). In this way, it should be possible for any animal with a natural ability to parse 
behaviour to determine the goals of others and relate those goals to the individuals’ prior 
histories, provided they are allowed sufficient experience from which to extract statistical 
regularities. Admittedly, this allows only a weak understanding of intention, but perhaps 
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that is all any non-human primate is capable of representing. From an evolutionary point 
of view, the issue is only whether advantage is conferred over individuals with no 
understanding of intention. 
However, without some extra ingredient, this approach would have difficulty in 
accounting for the differences between species: the failures and inadequacies become the 
stumbling block for comparative explanation, rather than the successes.  On current 
evidence, only a few species show ‘extra’, qualitatively different social capacities 
compared to most mammals and birds: why just them?  Dealing with this concern may 
require a more Kantian formulation, in which some crucial mental structure(s) must be 
innate, and differ qualitatively between taxa, whereas statistical extraction of regularities 
‘fills in the gaps’ from practical experience. In an analogy from the physical domain, 
consider monkeys’ representation of causal properties. Tamarin monkeys are sensitive to 
the properties of material that are relevant to tool-using, such as rigidity and length, but 
not colour and texture, despite not being tool-using monkeys (Hauser, 1997). It seems 
monkeys are predisposed to represent properties that will—in some species, in some 
environments—permit intelligent tool use to be acquired. But in species that lack an 
innate predisposition to represent the correct properties of materials, intelligent tool use 
will never be developed.   
What innate mental structure(s) might allow certain animal taxa to develop ‘extra’ 
capacities in the domain of social behaviour? In principle, ‘structure’ can be provided in 
two independent ways. The simpler way involves innate heuristics. For instance, a well-
known principle in animal learning is that innate ‘constraints’ may focus learning on 
biologically useful things, determining what is learnt easily and what is not: rats associate 
nausea but not electric shock with novel foods eaten many hours earlier (Garcia et al., 
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1966); perhaps similar genetic channelling determines we so readily learn to fear spiders 
but have to be strictly taught to fear electricity. At a more general level, the degree of 
native curiosity and the tendency to latent learning, picking up useful knowledge from 
certain situations, will be greater in species evolved to fill generalist niches in fast-
changing environments. Moreover, species that depend on motor or social skills may be 
naturally playful during the juvenile period, the play tending to allow development of an 
augmented motor repertoire and social skills (Bruner, 1972; Caro, 1995; Fagen, 1976; 
Whiten and Byrne, 1991).  
This level of explanation can account for some of the quantitative differences 
between species, for instance those dependent upon the complexity of social system and 
fineness of social categorization. When it comes to species differences that imply deeper 
levels of understanding, it may be necessary to invoke differences in cognitive 
architecture. For instance, social transmission of information occurs in monkeys and 
great apes, but the effects are apparently very different, with monkeys unable to learn 
complex novel behaviour by imitation (Byrne, 2002a; Visalberghi and Fragaszy, 2000). Is 
this because they have different cognitive systems? If species are not able to form the 
same mental representations, then what they can do with the same information may be 
radically different (Byrne et al., 2004). For instance, any social vertebrate is likely to 
benefit from social learning in some way, but those species that code what they see in 
terms only of a ‘conspecific engaged in activity at a place’ may only gain from local 
enhancement (Hoppitt and Laland, 2008). In contrast, if a species is able to code the 
time-sequence of specific actions applied by that conspecific, what it learns will be much 
richer (Byrne, 2002b).  
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We propose that the distribution of behaviour parsing abilities will be critical to 
species differences, both directly and indirectly.  Direct benefits accrue when 
understanding of others’ actions is required to deal with challenges: for instance, when 
correct interpretation of a social situation requires working out the intention behind 
another’s actions, or in imitatively acquiring a complex skill that would be unlikely to be 
discovered by trial and error exploration. In order to use the gist of another’s behaviour 
as a structure with which to build novel actions, it will be essential to have, in tandem 
with the perceptual process of behaviour parsing, the ability to build up hierarchically 
organized programs of goal-directed action, which will otherwise be evident in general 
problem solving behaviour: planning capabilities. Indirect benefits come from the 
informational content that can be passed on by social learning and culture, allowing 
adaptation to local environments to be mediated by social learning as well as genetical 
evolution (van Schaik et al., 1999; Washburn and Benedict, 1979; Whiten, 2000).   
In summary, we suggest that social cognition is not unique to primates, and that 
primate cognition is not uniquely social. We argue that most demonstrations of cognitive 
skill can be accounted for by quantitative differences in memory, with the tendency to 
larger memory most likely being driven by social competition (from conspecifics, and 
from predator/prey interactions). However, some particular skills such as cooperation, 
deception, perception of intent, imitation of novel skills, and mirror self recognition, 
signify a qualitatively different representation of mechanisms and minds. This probably 
relies on the presence of specific cognitive architecture which allows for behaviour 
parsing and the formation of hierarchically organised programs of action, the selection 
for which may have been driven by physical constraints. Our account of behaviour 
parsing has necessarily been focused narrowly on primates: the evidence is just not there 
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for other species, including those unusual species that show convergent abilities with 
great apes. The challenge for future research will be to discover whether this explanation 
might apply more generally, or whether a wholly new theory of higher-order cognitive 
abilities will need to be developed to explain the full pattern.  
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